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Abstract 
Urban sprawl has been at the centre of current debate on urban structure. Compared to the rich literature 
on urban sprawl in Western cities, relatively little is known about the physical consequence and the 
causes of urban sprawl in China. In China, for peasant collective-owned land (COL), land use right 
cannot be sold, transferred or leased for non-agricultural construction’. COL could be developed until it is 
acquired and leased out by the government. Through the process of land acquisition, the peasants could 
only get the compensation for 30 years' average of annual agricultural production value in addition to 
compensation for attachments, crops and vegetables which sometimes could hardly support the life of 
peasants who lost their land. To compensation for the peasants’ loss, the government would leave 10-15% 
of the acquired land to peasant collectives as Collectively Owned Economic Development Land 
(COEDL), allowing it used for industrial or commercial purpose. However, development of COEDL 
manifested to have low development density, quality and output. With a property rights approach, this 
research evaluates the development process of COEDL in Guangzhou. It has been revealed that high cost 
to obtain the permit of land use change (nongzhuanyong zhibiao), and to provide infrastructure and public 
facilities reduce the incentives of peasants to use COEDL legally and more efficiently. Furthermore, as 
COEDL is forbidden to transfer or mortgage, the financing ability of peasant collectives is thus impaired 
severely, allowing them only low investment on development. Use of COEDL thus contributes to urban 
sprawl in China. 
 
Keywords: urban sprawl, Collectively Owned Economic Development Land (COEDL), property rights, 
Guangzhou, China 
 
 
Introduction 
  Recently, much attention has been paid to discontinuous and often leapfrog 
development in peripheral areas of Chinese cities – regarded as urban sprawl. Large-
scale development zones, urbanized villages and large-scale gated communities in rural 
areas have been noticed and reported (Yeh and Wu 1996; Lin 2001; Tan et al. 2005). 
Taking Guangzhou as the example, both its economy and population have grown very 
rapidly since the 1980s, and the size of the built area has increased more than the 
population has (Table 1). The authors conducted a study in Dashi – a town located in 
the northern part of Panyu, a southern district of Guangzhou – to discover what happens 
in peripheral areas of Guangzhou. Observations reveal that development zones and 
large-scale gated communities interweave with villages and agricultural land. Almost all 
the development occurred in a discontinuous and often leapfrog manner, forming a 
typical urban sprawl landscape (see Figure 1).  
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Table 1: Expansion of Built Area of Guangzhou 
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Population
1  5.02 5.45 5.94 6.47 7.01 7.50 
Built area
2  135.96 162.92 187.40 259.10  431.5  734.99 
Note: 1 unit: million; 2.unit: km
2 
Source: Urban Planning Bureau of Guangzhou, accessed on 10 Sep. 2007 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Land Use in Dashi  (source: author’s survey). 
 
  Scholars are wondering what causes the instances of large-scale sprawl in China, 
especially the unique patterns of such sprawl. Existing research has attributed China's 
urban sprawl to the post-reform land market forces, and to the changes in power 
distribution over urban development (Liu and Wei 1997; Zhang 2000).  
  However, The urban areas are expanding with constant definition and 
redefinition of property rights over land (Zhu 2004). Voluntary exchange cannot 
flourish and develop into firms and markets without institutions to assign, arbitrate and 
protect private property rights (Webster and Lai 2003). Land property rights thus matter 
for the performance of urban expansion (Fischel 1999). This article aims to explore the 
mechanism for urban sprawl in China via a property rights approach. Following a 
critique of the existing literature, a hypothesis of “land rent residual” is introduced 
based on the analysis of land administration system (LAS) in China to explain that there 
is a single mechanism that produces differing types of sprawl. We believe that this type 
of study will be helpful for exploring some of the driving forces behind China’s urban 
expansion (Fung 1981; Wu and Yeh 1999; Logan 2001; Ho and Lin 2003) and 
accounting for urban sprawl in different contexts (McDonald 1993; Parker 1995; 
Richmond 1995; Freilich and Peshoff 1997). 
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Literature review: a critique 
  Naughton first noticed the spillover of urban activities into suburban regions and 
concluded sprawl in China is mostly a result of changing internal economic forces that 
brought previously urban economic activities into peripheral areas (Naughton 1995). In 
addition to the expansion of urban activities into farmland, sprawl in the Chinese 
context is also believed to result from the sprawl of state power. State priority placed on 
certain types of developments and locations bears some responsibility for sprawl. A 
review of existing studies reveals that the studies offer common definitions but different 
explanation for three types of ‘urban sprawl’ in China.  
 
Development Zones 
  Chinese local governments have set up a large number of ‘development zones’ 
that are often large and not connected with existing built up areas. Especially when 
considering that transportation in China still relies heavily on mass transit, such 
development zones can best be characterized as leapfrog development at a macro-level 
(Deng and Huang 2004). The boom in development zones have been studied from 
political perspectives (Huang and Yang 1996; Zhou 1997; Cartier 2001). Existing 
studies put forth two important forces behind the development zone phenomenon—
local government's desire for economic development and their thirst for fiscal revenue 
from the leasing of public land–which are related to China's decentralized fiscal system 
and the changing structure of local public finance (Deng and Huang 2004). 
 
Large-Scale Residential Projects 
  Recently, scholars have noticed an increasingly commonplace phenomenon in 
China: low-density settlements of large, single-family houses reachable only by 
automobiles on networks of new roads, occupied exclusively by middle- and upper-
class residents, and often gated and governed by restrictive covenants (Tan et al. 2005). 
Real estate development in the periphery has been categorized as ‘amenity migration’—
the purchasing of primary or second residences in rural areas valued for their aesthetic, 
recreational, and other consumption-orientated use values (McCarthy 2008). It is 
believed that increases in the mobility of elites, rapid growth in relative and absolute 
incomes for certain classes of urban professionals, ongoing reductions in the friction of 
distance through developments in transportation and communications technologies, and 
the increased circulation of representations of prized rural landscapes are the main 
reasons for the emergence of large scale gated communities (Buckley 2003; Darling 
2005; Gogia 2006; Moss 2006). 
 
Urbanized Villages 
  Rural villages on the urban fringe have also developed quickly since the reform, 
although some scholars emphasize economic and physical development of such villages 
actually lags behind the population expansion (Deng and Huang 2004). Separate bodies 
of literature on urbanized villages have developed along two different veins. In the first 
vein, researchers are more interested in the social aspects of these villages such as 
ethnicity and culture (Ma and Xiang 1998). The second approach is more spatially 
based. For instance, Leaf looked at those villages from a broader perspective of rural 
urbanization (Leaf 2002). Based on a study on metropolitan development and spatial 
restructuring in the Pearl River Delta, Lin also argued that such development is largely 
driven by rural industrialization (Lin 2001). Such arguments are extensions of studies of 
the uniqueness of rural industrialization and rural–urban transition in Asian countries by 
McGee (1991). Desakota, a term coined by him, is basically a form of urbanization of 
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the countryside first observed in Indonesia (McGee 1991). However, it is more a 
description of new spatial structures, with a relatively vague explanation of the driving 
forces. 
 
Existing studies on development zones, urbanized villages and large-scale gated 
communities have been quite separate from one another. A macro-spatial perspective 
that links the three phenomena in the context of urban structure is missing in the 
literature. Any inquiry on urban structure, especially the urban fringe, and urban sprawl 
must deal with how rural land is developed into urban land and also discuss property 
rights over land. Therefore the evolution of China’s Land Administration System – 
which defines property rights over land – becomes an important factor to our analysis. 
 
China’s Land Administration System 
For rural land 
  Since 1978, a series of market-oriented transformations have been initiated to 
stimulate economic development. Land reform is a major component of these reforms. 
In rural areas, the household contract responsibility system (HCRS) return land use 
rights to individual farmers by allocating collective land resources to individual farm 
households via contract. It is an institutional arrangement in which plots are contracted 
to farm households for cultivation while the right to dispose of the land remains with 
the collective. However, there were no laws dealing with land use and administration. 
So the occupation, use, transfer and management of rural land were not subject to any 
formal criteria. Consequently, some farmers ‘illegally’ sold, rented and mortgaged the 
land which they contracted from collectives. In the meantime, “Regulations for 
Developing Commune/Village Owned Enterprises (draft)” (Guangyu fazhan shedui qiye 
ruogan wenti de guiding (shixing cao’an)) was issued in 1979, stimulating the 
flourishing of township and village enterprises (TVEs) (Wu 2008). An increasing 
amount of collective land was thus ‘illegally’ occupied and developed. From 1982 to 
1986 about 10 million cases of illegal land occupation occurred throughout the country 
(Qu 1991).  
 
Since 1985 the state has taken quick responses to such problems. Land Administrative 
Bureaus (LAB) were established at various levels of government to: deal with 
applications for non-agricultural land use, survey land resources, design general land 
use plans, and supervise land use patterns and land quality changes, etc. Quotas for land 
use change from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors are decided by the central 
government based on China’s national land use plan and are distributed to provinces 
and cities. Local LAB then allocate the quotas to different economic sectors. Farmer 
collectives – as the owners of collective owned land – are strictly forbidden from 
developing agricultural land without the approval of local LAB. Regulated by Land 
Administration Law, collective owned land is banned from sale, rent, transfer and 
mortgage for non-agricultural development (Pu and Li 1998). Thus, the ownership of 
rural collective land is incomplete. In most cases, only after land acquisition by the 
government, may rural land be developed. However, there is still one way that 
collective owned land may be developed. After the government’s land acquisition, the 
government might leave 10-15% of the acquired land to farmer collectives as economic 
development land (EDL), for industrial or commercial purposes. Such land could be 
rented, but is also forbidden from sale, transfer and mortgage.  
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For urban land 
  Simultaneously with the reforms on rural land, a sentence stating that ‘the right 
of land use of state owned land can be transferred in accordance with the law’ was 
incorporated into Article 10 of the Constitution in 1988, initiating the paid transfer of 
land use rights (LURs) in urban areas. Urban land is no longer issued and supplied free. 
LURs for certain time durations (such as 40, 50 and 70 years) could be obtained by 
negotiations, tenders, and auctions, and could be transferred to others in the land market 
(Li 1999). In other words, within those certain time durations, land use rights over state-
owned urban land is complete. In practice, local-level governments were responsible for 
LURs transfer activities (Keng 1996; Xu 1997; Zhang 1997). Land lease payment 
became the most important part of local government’s “Extra-budget Revenue” (EBR). 
EBR consists of tax surcharges and user fees levied by local level government agencies. 
Unlike state allocated budgetary revenues, the local government need not share EBR 
with the central government. So EBR has become the main source for local 
infrastructure investment. Because urban construction in the pre-reform era lagged 
behind the citizens’ requirement for living conditions and budgetary funds were far 
from enough to support infrastructure construction needs, it is easy to see why there was 
local enthusiasm for land leasing and urban development.  
 
With the establishment of new the land administration system, the legal urban 
expansion process became a sole process of rural land changing to urban land, together 
with the process of incomplete collective ownership changing to complete land use 
rights of the government and land leaseholders. This Dualistic system of property rights 
over land creates uneven values between rural and urban land, which then arouses local 
interest for urban expansion, and finally to urban sprawl. To investigate the ‘urban 
sprawl’ mechanism in a more detailed way, this paper introduces the term ‘land rent 
residual’ to explain the urban sprawl process. 
 
Hypothesis: Land rent residual in transitional china 
  The ‘traditional’ shape of land use used to be characterized by convergence 
towards city centres following the bid rent function (Alonso, 1964). It could also 
explain the emergence of land rent residual (LRR). In this dual system of land property 
rights (Figure 2) that China has, land between Q1 and Q2 has to be acquired at the price 
set by the government (compensation to agricultural outputs (P3), which is much lower 
than the price of land leasing) and then leased out at market price P1. LRR (gray area) 
thus emerges as revenues which could be claimed by the local government due to the 
disparity between the price to acquire rural land – which is very low due to the 
incomplete property rights—and price to lease out urban land – which is much higher 
due to complete property rights.  
New LAS and the central government exclusion of EBR stimulate local 
government to chase as much as LRR as possible. However, to capitalize on LRR, the 
local government has to lease out the land, which means it has to increase the value of 
land to a point where potential land leasers feel it is profitable to rent and develop the 
land. Leapfrog development is thus carried out to increase land value. Detailed analysis 
of different types of urban sprawl using data from Dashi, the study area, is carried out. 
Urbani izziv, volume 23, supplement 2, 2012 (special issue) 
   S155
 
Figure 2: Land Rent Residual in China 
 
Application 1: Development Zone 
  In Figure 3, the local government expands the urban boundary to Q4 although 
market forces would only push the boundary to Q2  by land acquisition. With the 
investment on infrastructure at a location beyond Q2 – taking Q3 as the example – local 
government successfully changes the bid rent curve for land use from PAC to PAFEG 
(with infrastructure investment cost of BDEG). Areas between Q2 and Q4 thus become 
worth to develop. Leapfrog development emerge and LRR of gray area (ADEF+BHIG) 
is capitalized. 
 
Figure 3: Leapfrog Development and Land Rent Residual 
 
  To capture the LRR with the least investment, the local government might apply 
two techniques. In the first case, the local government could acquire land, clear it, 
provide basic infrastructure and then lease it out for urban use. Referring to the Bid 
Rent Curve, industry would be the first party to use such land. Applying to build 
development zones would also be the easiest way to gain quota for development and to 
generate local tax for local government in China. In the second case, the local 
government could lease rural land to developers for residential projects if the land value 
is increased high enough. 
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  By 2003, there was over 10 km
2 of land used for industry in Dashi, but the total 
output (industry value-added) was just 1.04 billion yuan, i.e. the output rate of industrial 
land is about 100 million/km
2. This rate is just 1/10 of the output rate of some areas in 
the Yangzi River Delta, such as Wenzhou (898.86 million/ km
2) and Shaoxing (1.2 
billion/ km
2)
1. In Shibei Development Zone (the biggest development zone in Dashi, 
owned by the town government, area: 466 ha), modern electronics manufacturing 
facilities are surrounded by rural land and vacant plots. These rural and vacant parcels 
reduce the average output of the land. Developed land accounts for only 36.2% of the 
total area
2. The Dashi government acquired the land used for Shibei Development Zone 
through a deal that only compensated the individual villagers for 30 years' worth of 
average annual agricultural production in addition to compensation for attached land 
improvements, crops and vegetables – which generally amounts to 3000 yuan/ ha
3 in 
the Pearl River Delta. The land was leased out at a very low price to attract large 
manufacturers to agglomerate. It was actually the annual income tax paid by those 
manufacturers that the local governments had targeted.  
 
Application 2: Large scale residential projects 
  Under the same mechanism and behaviors that drove development of industrial 
zones, large residential projects are now found spread out in the urban periphery of 
Chinese cities. In middle 1990s, Panyu became the hotspot for residential development 
within Guangzhou. A multitude of large residential projects were developed along 
Huanan Expressway that the local government constructed in 1999. In Dashi, Lijiang 
Garden, Luoxi New Town, Xinghe Bay are all large residential projects covering over 
100 ha each. Such projects were aimed at fulfilling the wants of Guangzhou citizens by 
providing bigger apartments and better facilities within a luxurious environment at 
relatively lower prices. Due to the poor condition of existing public facilities, the 
developers provided a variety of infrastructure and amenities within the residential 
projects. For example, Lijiang Bridge in Lijiang Garden and Zhixin Middle School 
(Xinghe Bay) were both provided by developers. Those and others were good quality 
facilities in order to attract the target customers (Figure 4). Xinghe Bay even built a 
well-designed wooden sightseeing boardwalk along the Back Channel of the Pearl 
River. 
Figure 4:  Public Facilities in Large Gated Communities in Dashi 
Source: photos taken by author 
 
  As one-off payments by developers to the government for land use eliminates 
the government from the potential for a long-term development profit, the local 
                                                 
1 Source: ‘Report on agglomeration plan for Panyu’s industry zone’ (2007), Panyu Planning Bureau internal working 
report. accessed on Nov. 7, 2007 
2 Id. 
3 Source: interview to officials in Construction Service Centre of Dashi, on 8
th Nov, 2007. 
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governments of Panyu and Dashi went so far as to create joint ventures with investors 
for real estate development. These joint ventures meaninvestors must cooperate with the 
government’s subordinated development companies (Table 2). By sharing the 
shareholding, the local government not only enjoys the land lease payment but also 
shares in revenue from the sale of housing units.  
 
Table 2: A Sampling of Joint Development Projects between Local Government and 
Investors Real Estate Projects in Dashi (Shareholding) 
Project name   Government’s development 
company 
Investor 1  Investor 2 
Xinghe Bay   Panyu Unite Development Co. 
Dashi Division (30%) 
Guangzhou Hongyu 
Group. (51%) 
Shenzhen Southern 
Xiangjiang In. (19%) 
Lijiang Garden  Panyu Unite Development Co.  Yuhai Group   
Luoxi  New  Town  Kaiyuan Real Estate Industry 
Co.  
Yourong Ltd. Co. 
(HK) 
Hengji Zhaoye 
Development Co. (HK) 
Source: archives of the Panyu Planning Bureau, accessed on 8 Jul, 2007 
 
Application 3: Urbanized villages 
  As Lin highlighted, rural industrialization plays an important part in 
metropolitan development and spatial restructuring in the Pearl River Delta. It can also 
be explained by LRR. In fact, LRR captured by the local government through land 
leasing would inevitably stimulate the farmer collective – as the land owner – to rent 
their land out without changing its ownership. Under the legal system, land beyond Q1 
won’t be developed because the official land leasing price (P1) is higher than potential 
land users would willing to pay (according to bid rent curve). In such cases, the 
government won’t acquire rural land. This leaves an opportunity for existing land 
owners – farmer collectives – to rent land out at a price lower than P1 but higher than P3. 
Such development might be legal as each village is allowed to use a certain amount of 
land (EDL) for industrial or commercial purposes (although the village is not allowed to 
transfer title to that land). It may be illegal if the village changes land use types from 
agriculture to other use without permission from the local government. Due to the 
uncertainty of village behavior regarding land, development of collective owned land 
ends up being fragmented. In Figure 5, village 1 and village 2 rent Q2Q3 and Q4Q5 to 
factories, and capture the land value of CDEF and HGI.  
 
 
Figure 5: Development of Collective Owned Land 
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Small industrial parks have been observed in every village in Dashi. Land in 
these industrial parks, which have poor infrastructure provision, is rented to various 
types of small factories. Rent is very low. For instance, in Beilian village, which is 
located in the northwest part of Dashi, the rent for workshops is 9-15 yuan/m
2. As the 
duration of land rental contracts is ten or fewer years, factories are hesitant to invest 
significantly in infrastructure and fixed equipment. Workshops in these industry parks 
are thus poorly constructed and end up easily dilapidated (see Figure 6). The large 
numbers of small factories also require many migrants to work in them. Thus a demand 
for low price accommodations arises. Villagers construct small apartments on land 
allocated to individual village families and rent rooms to those workers.  
 
 
   
 
Figure 6: Small factories in villages (Beilian Village) 
Source: photos taken by author 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
  China's economic reforms over the past two decades have been partial and 
gradual . Partial reform can result in inefficient resource allocation at the interface of 
different sectors (Murphy et al. 1992). A typical case is LAS reform, which has 
successfully promoted the emergence of land markets and increased land use efficiency 
but also has created the problem of urban sprawl. 
 
New land administration system endows complete land use rights over state owned 
land, yet incomplete land ownership over collective owned land, causing a gap between 
the rent of state and collective owned land. Land Rent Residual (LRR) thus emerges as 
an appurtenance of differing property rights over state and collective owned land 
induced by LAS reform.  
 
As land leasing payments are the most important part of local Extra-budget Revenue, 
local governments tend to lease more land to capture LRR. In practice, local 
governments lease land for factories or big scale residential projects to capitalize LRR 
after they acquire land and provide basic infrastructures. LRR captured by the local 
government through land acquisition and leasing also stimulates the farmer collectives– 
as the land owner – to rent their land legally or illegally at a lower price than state 
owned land to capture part of LRR. Through the concept of LRR, it is easy to 
understand that uneven land reform causes the existence of an “envelope” between 
urban land and rural land. Undesirable consequences emerge on urban fringe. 
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To a large extent, the problem of LRR seeking arise from remaining imperfections in 
the system of land administration, particularly ambiguous property rights, the limited 
competence of the land administrative organizations, and weak law enforcement, which 
all have negative effects on land use efficiency and cause the problem of urban sprawl. 
A number of options for further reform of rural LAS, especially with respect to land 
property rights, land marketing and the state administration system, have to been 
considered. 
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